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This  paper  demonstrates  that  the  terms  of  trade  are  determined  by  the  equalization  of  profit  rates 
across  international  regulating  capitals,  for  socially  determined  national  real  wages.  This 
provides  a  classical/Marxian  basis  for  the  explanation  of  real  exchange  rates,  based  on  the  same 
principle  of  absolute  cost  advantage  which  rules  national  prices.  Large  international  flows  of 
direct  investment  are  not  necessary  for  this  result,  since  the  international  mobility  of  financial 
capital  is  sufficient.  Such  a  determination  of  the  terms  of  trade  implies  that  international  trade 
will  generally  give  rise  to  persistent  structural  trade  imbalances  covered  by  endogenously 
generated  capital  flows  which  will  fill  any  existing  gaps  in  the  overall  balance  of  payments.  It 
also  implies  that  devaluations  will  not  have  a  lasting  effect  on  trade  balances,  unless  they  are  also 
attended  by  fundamental  changes  in  national  real  wages  or  productivities.  Finally,  it  implies  that 
neither  the  absolute  nor  relative  version  of  the  Purchasing  Power  Parity  hypothesis  (PPP)  will 
generally  hold,  with  the  exception  that  the  relative  version  of  PPP  will  appear  to  hold  when  a 
country  experiences  a  relatively  high  inflation  rate.  Such  patterns  are  well  documented,  and  in 
contrast  to  comparative  advantage  or  PPP  theory,  the  present  approach  implies  that  the  existing 
historical  record  is  perfectly  coherent.  Empirical  tests  of  the  propositions  advanced  in  this  paper 
have  been  conducted  elsewhere,  with  good  results. The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  demonstrate  that  real  exchange  rates  between  countries  are 
determined  by  the  equalization  of  profit  rates  across  international  regulating  capitals,  for  socially 
determined  national  real  wages.  This  provides  a  c1assicaUmarxia.n  explanation  of  international 
terms  of  trade,  based  on  the  same  principle  of  absolute  cost  advantage  which  rules  national 
prices.  Such  an  approach  has  the  decided  virtue  that  it  is  quite  consistent  with  the  major 
empirical  patterns  of  international  trade.  It  is  also  in  direct  contrast  to  the  principle  of 
comparative  advantage  upon  which  so  much  of  international  trade  theory  rests.  The  theoretical 
arguments  presented  here  are  tested  empirically  in  (Roman,  1997;  Napoles;  Antonopoulos,  1997; 
Shaikh,  1998) 
Certain  assumptions  are  crucial  to  what  follows.  Within  a  nation,  capital  and  labor  are  assumed 
to  be  fairly  mobile,  although  the  latter  is  assumed  to  be  both  slower  and  more  subject  to  cultural 
and  historical  ties-that-bind.  For  this  reason,  real  wages  may  differ  across  regions  of  a  given 
nation,  within  limits.  There  is  no  presumption  of  full  employment. 
On  an  international  scale,  it  is  assumed  that  financial  and  nonfinancial  capital  moves  across 
nations  in  search  of  higher  returns.  Impediments  to  this  mobility,  particularly  for  financial 
capital,  are  assumed  to  much  smaller  than  those  to  the  international  mobility  of  labor.  Thus  it  is 
assumed  that  profit  rates  on  new  direct  investment  gravitate  around  common  means  across 
countries.  We  will  see  that  the  mobility  of  financial  capital  is  sufficient  to  produce  this  outcome. 
On  the  other  hand,  real  wage  differences  between  countries  can  be  greater,  and  more  persistent, 
than  those  within  nations. 
Within  any  one  industry,  be  it  national  or  international,  new  technologies  come  into  being  at 
various  intervals,  while  prior  ones  decline  in  their  competitiveness  and  eventually  die  out  (are 
scrapped).  This  never-ending  dynamic  produces  a  spectrum  of  technologies  in  operation  in  each 
industry,  with  the  capitals  with  the  lowest  reproducible  costs  regulating  the  market  price.  Since 
the  capitals  in  any  one  (national  or  international)  industry  may  be  spread  out  across  many  regions 
or  nations,  the  mix  and  even  levels  of  technology  can  differ  across  such  geographical 
boundaries. 
None  of  this  precludes  international  trade  from  having  an  impact  on  either  real  wages  or 
technologies.  It  does  imply,  however,  that  the  substantial  determinants  of  each  are  located  within 
the  political  and  cultural  matrices  of  the  nations  involved.  These  can  and  do  change,  sometimes 
dramatically.  But  there  is  no  mechanism  which  will  make  them  change  in  such  a  way  as  to 
automatically  balance  trade  among  nations. 
The  preceding  assumptions  about  international  differences  in  real  wages  and  technology,  the 
latter  expressed  in  terms  of  particular  input-output  coefficients,  are  familiar  ones  in  the  classical 
and  marxian  traditions.  Indeed,  they  are  the  very  ground  from  which  Ricardo  himself  derives  the 
very  principle  of  comparative  costs  (Shaikh,  1980),  a  principle  which  continues  to  underpin 
1 modern  trade  theory  in  almost  all  trade  models,  including  Heckscher-Ohlin  (HO)‘.  Most 
importantly,  persistent  international  wage  and  technological  differences  still  characterize  the 
world  today  (Dollar,  Wolff,  &  Baumol,  1988,  pp.  3 1,33,42).  The  point  is  to  explain  how  free 
trade  is  grounded  in  them,  and  in  turn  reproduces  them. 
The  subsequent  analytical  arguments  are  posed  in  terms  of  a  familiar  two-sector  model.  More 
general  derivations  of  the  same  basic  propositions  can  be  found  in  (Shaikh,  199 1). 
I.  The  determination  of  relative  prices  within  one  country 
Real  exchange  rates  are  simply  international  relative  prices  in  common-currency.  In  order  to 
understand  their  determination,  it  is  useful  to  first  consider  the  formation  of  competitive  relative 
prices  within  one  nation. 
Imagine  that  there  are  many  producers  of  any  given  commodity,  grouped  according  to  their  unit 
costs  of  production.  I  have  argued  elsewhere  that  in  this  case,  the  set  of  producers  with  the  lowest 
reproducible  costs  will  be  the  ones  whose  cost  conditions  drive  the  market  price,  because  it  is 
these  conditions  of  production  which  will  be  the  target  of  new  investment  flows.  In  each 
industry,  the  capitals  which  satisfy  these  conditions  constitute  the  regulating  capitals  of  that 
industry. 
Since  it  is  the  profitability  of  these  new  investments  which  regulates  capital  flows  across 
industries,  the  general  rate  of  profit  will  be  formed  by  the  movement  of  capital  across  the 
regulating  conditions  of  production  in  each  industry.  For  the  economy  as  a  whole,  given  the  real 
wages  in  each  industry,  it  is  these  regulating  conditions  which  will  determine  the  relative  price 
and  the  general  rate  of  profit  (Shaikh,  1996,  pp.  67-76). 
The  rates  of  profit  which  are  equalized  by  capital  flows  are  the  profit  rates  of  new  investments  in 
the  regulating  conditions  of  production.  Non-regulating  capitals  will  be  forced  by  competition  to 
sell  at  the  same  price,  and  will  therefore  have  a  variety  of  profit  rates  determined  by  their  own 
various  conditions  of  production.  Since  each  sector  will  have  its  own  complement  of  non- 
regulating  capitals,  depending  on  the  history  of  technical  change  in  that  sector,  average sectoral 
profit  rates  need  not  be  equalized.  This  is  a  familiar  result  in  the  classical/marxian  tradition,  since 
it  forms  the  basis  for  differential  rent  in  agriculture.  As  is  well  known,  in  the  case  of  agriculture, 
the  genera&  reproducible low-cost  conditions  of  production  (the  ones  of  which  new  investment 
‘Differences  between  potential  costs  of  production  are  the  point  of  departure  for  both 
absolute  and  comparative  cost  theories  of  international  trade,  since  there  is  no  basis  for  trade 
if  all  nations  good  produce  all  goods  at  the  same  costs.  The  HO  model  assumes  that 
comparative  cost  theory  regulates  trade,  but  claims  that  the  underlying  potential  cost 
differences  arise  from  the  impact  of  differing  national  ‘factor  endowments’  on  a  common 
international  production  function. 
2 can  avail  themselves)  are  on  the  margin  of  cultivation  precisely  because  better  lands  are  in  ml1 
use.  In  the  case  of  industry,  similar  differences  in  costs  arise  from  the  fact  that  ongoing  technical 
change  gives  rise  to  a  spectrum  of  vintages  still  in  existence,  most  of  whom  are  no  longer  at  the 
cutting  edge  but  still  profitable  enough  to  keep  in  play.  Here,  it  is  the  best  technology  generally 
available  for  new  investments  which  forms  the  regulating  conditions.  In  both  cases,  it  is  the 
dominance  of  the  lowest  reproducible  cost  producers  that  makes  ‘absolute  cost  advantage’  the 
regulating  principle  of  competition  within  a  single  nation. 
1.  National  competitive  prices  with  unequal  real  wages 
Consider  a  simple  two-country,  two-commodity  example,  in  which  there  are  two  producers  for 
each  type  of  good.  Let  pk  =  price  of  capital  goods,  pc  =  price  of  consumer  goods,  a  = 
(circulating)  capital  input,  and  1 =  labor  input,  all  per  unit  output  of  the  regulating  capitals.  Let  r 
=  rate  of  profit,  w  =  money  wage,  wr  =  real  wage.  In  anticipation  of  the  international  case,  we 
will  not  assume  that  each  producer  faces  the  same  real  wage,  but  only  that  local  real  wages  are 
socially  determined  (think  of  any  two  producers  as  being  located  in  different  regions  of  a 
country). 
As  long  as  competition  between  sellers  of  a  particular  good  compels  them  to  sell  at  roughly  the 
same  price’,  technological  and/or  real  wage  differences  among  producers  will  give  rise  to  profit 
rate  differentials. 
=  (pk  l  ak  +  PC  ’  w-k  l  lk  )‘(l+rc) 
l’)Pc  =(Pk  l  ak’  +  pc  l  wrk’  ’  lk’  )  l  (  I+&‘) 
2,  Pk  =  (Pk  l  ac  +w  wrc  l  h  )“(l+rk) 
2’)  pk  =  (pk  .  ac’  +  pc  l  wrc’  .  lc’  )  l  (l+rk’  ) 
In  each  sector,  the  production  conditions  of  one  of  the  producers  will  be  the  regulating  ones  --  i.e. 
will  represent  the  lowest-cost  conditions  which  new  investment  in  the  industry  can  expect  to 
reproduce3.  Intersectoral  capital  flows  will  therefore  enforce  those  prices  which  equalize  the 
?The  law  of  one  price  encompasses  price  differentials  due  to  transportation  costs  and  local 
surtaxes.  If  these  are  high  enough  to  block  out  nonlocal  producers,  then  the  good  in  question 
becomes  a  nontradable  and  the  local  producer  becomes  the  regulating  capital.  This  can  be 
accommodated  by  treating  each  nontradable  as  a  distinct  good,  as  in  section  11.4, 
3The  definition  of  ‘lowest  cost’  in  unambiguous  in  the  case  of  circulating  capital,  since  the 
unit  materials  and  wage  costs  is  also  the  capital  advanced,  so  that  the  profit  margin  on  costs 
is  also  the  profit  rate  on  capital  advanced.  Then  the  producer  with  the  lowest  cost  will  also 
the  one  with  both  the  highest  profit  margin  and  profit  rate,  since  all  producers  face  the  same 
prices.  However,  once  fixed  capital  is  introduced  into  the  story,  the  issue  turns  on  what 
3 profit  rates  on  these  specific  capitals.  And  these  prices  in  turn  will  determine  the  particular  profit 
rates  of  the  nonregulating  capitals.  It  follows  that  average  profit  rates  will  not  generally  be 
equalized  across  sectors. 
Assuming  the  regulating  capitals  to  be  the  tirst  in  each  equation,  and  allowing  for  profit  rate 
equalization  across  them,  we  get 
1)  pC  =  (pk  l  aC  +  pCa  wrC  l  lC)*(l+r) 
2,  Pk  =  (l?k  l  ak  +  PC  ’  w-k.  lk)O(l+r) 
This  in  turn  can  be  rewritten  in  terms  of  relative  prices,  the  rate  of  profit,  and  the  two  real  wages: 
l)’  i%  h?k  =  (  ak  +  (j&k)’  wk  l  lk  )O(l+r) 
2)’  1  =  (aC  +  h%hk  1’  wrc  l  lc  )“(l+r) 
Given  the  two  real  wages,  the  preceding  system  reduces  to  two  equations  in  two  variables  (r,  pC 
/pk),  which  can  then  be  solved  for  the  rate  of  profit  and  relative  prices.  Except  for  the 
differentiation  of  the  two  real  sectoral  wages,  all  of  this  is  familiar.  The  resulting  equilibrium 
values  are  of  the  form 
r  -r(wrcywrk) 
P~/Pk=F(wr~,wrk,r)=f(wr~,wrk) 
2.  Effects  of  real  wage  increases  on  relative  prices 
As  is  the  case  of  uniform  wage  systems,  an  increase  in  either  sector’s  real  wage  will  lower  the 
general  rate  of  profit  (see  the  Appendix).  But  the  effect  on  relative  price  may  be  more  complex. 
A  rise  in  an  industry’s  real  wage  raises  its  unit  labor  costs,  but  also  lowers  the  general  profit  rate 
(and  indirectly  affects  the  prices  of  its  non-labor  inputs).  The  former  tends  to  raise  the  price  in 
that  particular  industry.  The  latter  tends  to  lower  the  price  in  all  industries,  since  all  are  directly 
affected  by  the  lower  general  rate  of  profit.  It  would  not  be  surprising,  therefore,  if  a  fall  in  a 
particular  industry’s  real  wage  almost  always  lowered  its  relative  price.  Nonetheless,  it  is 
theoretically  possible  that  the  opposite  result  could  hold,  because  possible  falls  in  the  prices  of 
determines  the  highest  expected  profit  rate  from  a  new  investment.  &zd  this  in  turn  depends 
on  the  anticipatedpath  offutureprices  in  theface  of  competition.  If  competition  is  assumed 
to  emulate  perfect  competition,  so  that  producers  are  assumed  to  be  passive  ‘price  takers’  who 
expect  the  present  price  to  continue  indel-mitely,  then  the  one  with  the  highest  profit  rate  at 
the  current  selling  price  is  the  regulating  capital.  However,  if  competition  is  viewed  as  a 
combative  process  (real  competition)  marked  by  rate  in  the  face  of  competitively  induced 
cuts  in  selling  prices  (Nakatani,  1980;  Shaikh,  1980). 
4 materials  and  capital  goods  might  overcome  the  direct  effect  of  a  wage  increase  (Sraffa,  1963, 
Ch.  VI). 
One  can  arrive  at  a  more  fruitI%  result,  which  has  the  additional  advantage  that  it  applies  to  any 
prices  whatsoever  (e.g.  market  prices,  monopoly  prices,  etc.).  The  secret  is  to  regroup  the 
components  of  any  price  into  its  regulating  vertically  integrated  unit  labor  costs  and 
corresponding  profit  margins(Shaikh,  1984,  pp.  65-71)4.  For  simplicity  in  exposition,  consider  a 
circulating  capital  system  with  a  good  whose  price  p  =  $10.  We  can  always  split  this  price  into  its 
regulating  direct  unit  labor  costs  ($3),  direct  unit  profits  ($2),  and  its  unit  material  costs  ($5).  But 
the  last  element  is  simply  the  price  of  some  bundle  of  goods,  and  can  therefore  be  split  into  its 
unit  labor  costs  ($2.5),  unit  profits  @OS),  and  the  materials  costs  of  the  original  materials  cost 
($2).  This  last  component,  which  is  the  materials  cost  of  the  original  materials  cost,  can  once 
again  be  decomposed  in  the  same  manner.  As  we  continue  this  process,  the  residual  will  get  ever 
smaller,  until  in  the  limit  we  can  express  the  original  price  ($10)  as  a  sum  of  direct  and  indirect 
unit  labor  costs  ($3  +  $2.5  +  . . .  =  $7)  and  its  direct  and  indirect  profit  margins  ($2  +  $0.5  +  . . .  = 
$3).  The  first  term  in  this  ultimate  decomposition  may  be  called  the  vertically  integrated  unit 
labor  cost  of  a  commodity  (v  =  $7),  and  the  second  its  vertically  integrated  unit  profit  ($3). 
Factoring  out  the  former  allows  us  to  express  any  price  as  the  product  of  its  vertically  integrated 
unit  labor  costs  and  a  vertically  integrated  profit-wage  ratio:  p  =  vm (1  +  7~). 
It  follows  that  we  can  always  express  the  ratio  of  any  two  prices  as  the  product  of  two  terms:  the 
vertically  integrated  unit  labor  cost  ratio  (which  can  be  expressed  in  real  terms  by  dividing  both 
elements  by  the  price  of  consumption  goods),  and  the  relative  gross  margins.  So  in  our  case,  we 
can  always  write 
where  vr  =  vlpc  ,  and  7~ =  the  vertically  integrated  profit-wage  ratio. 
In  arriving  at  the  vertically  integrated  unit  labor  costs,  we  summed  direct  and  indirect  wage  costs 
per  unit  output.  We  could  also  construct  a  parallel  measure  of  vertically  integrated  unit  labor 
requirements  by  summing  direct  and  indirect  labor  requirements,  which  gives  us  the  total  labor 
per  unit  output  (J.)  required  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  production  of  a  commodity.  But  since 
wage  costs  are  simply  wage  rates  times  quantity  of  labor  required,  we  can  also  express  vertically 
integrated  unit  labor  costs  as  the  product  of  an  uverage  vertically  integrated  wage  (WY =  vr/k)  and 
the  total  labor  requirement  (a). 
where  z&  =  [( 1  +  &)/  (1  +  &)I,  and  wr  =  vr/L 
41t is  the  costs  of  the  regulating  capitals  which  drive  the  market  price.  Those  of  nonregulating 
capitals  do  not. 
5 The  term  Zig maybe  thought  of  as  a  ‘disturbance’  term  whose  size  depends  on  the  extent  of  the 
dispersion  between  the  vertically  integrated  profit-wage  ratios  of  the  two  sectors.  And  here,  it  is 
very  important  to  recognize  that  each  of  these  vertically  integrated  profit  wage  ratios  is  merely 
some  sort  of  weighted  average  of  the  direct  profit-wage  ratios  of  the  two  sectors.  This  means  that 
the  dispersion  of  the  vertically  integrated  profit-wage  ratios  will  be  smaller  than  that  of  the  direct 
ratios  --  generally  much  smaller.  In  addition,  since  the  direct  protit-wage  ratios  tend  to  smaller 
than  1,  so  too  will  the  vertically  integrated  ratios.  Adding  one  to  each  of  the  latter,  which  is 
necessary  to  form  zck,  will  further  dampen  the  dispersion  of  the  resultant  variables. 
A  simple  illustration  will  suffice.  Suppose  the  direct  profit-wage  ratios  are  2/3,  1/3  (a  variation  of 
lOOoh), and  the  vertically  integrated  ones  are  315,  215 (a  variation  of  50%).  Then  the  disturbance 
term  z  =  (1  +  3/5)/(  1  +  215)  =  1.14,  which  implies  that  price  ratios  will  deviate  from  real  unit 
labor  cost  ratios  by  less  than  15%.  As  it  turns  out  actual  empirical  deviations  in  the  United  States, 
at  the  level  of  80-sector  input-output  tables,  are  even  smaller 
(Shaikh,  1998a)(Chilcote,  1997)(Bienenfeld,  1988)(Ochoa,  1984). 
It  is  therefore  an  extremely  good  approximation  to  write 
4)  pc  /  pk  =  (MV~  l  &  /  w~~.JL,J  =  relative  real  vertically  integrated  unit  labor  costs 
It  is  worth  recalling  that  in  the  preceding  expression  each  vertically  integrated  real  unit  labor  cost 
is  a  weighted  average  of  various  direct  real  unit  labor  costs,  including  the  sector’s  own. 
Therefore,  if  a  sector’s  direct  real  unit  labor  cost  fall,  other  thing  being  equal,  so  too  will  its 
vertically  integrated  one.  It  follows  that  the  relativeprice  of  a  sector  will  tend  to fall  --  i.e.  tend 
to  depreciate  --  when  the  real  unit  labor  cost  of  its  regulating  capitals  falls. 
The  preceding  approximation  is  very  useful  for  further  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis.  But 
must  be  noted  that  the  determinacy  of  relative  prices  (and  subsequently  of  international  terms  of 
trade)  does  not  depend  upon  this  approximation. 
3.  National  relative  prices  with  unequal  profit  rates 
We  now  consider  what  would  happen  if,  instead  of  common  profit  rates  across  sectors,  there 
existed  dzyferent  profit  rates  determined  by  (say)  differing  sectoral  levels  of  ‘monopoly  power’? 
The  surprising  answer  is  that  arbitrary  dzyferentials  in  regulatingprojit  rates  are  notpossible. 
There  is  an  underlying  connection  between  them  arising  from  the  exchange  relations  between  the 
sectors. 
If  we  were  to  allow  for  differing  rates  of  profit  rc,  rk  in  equations  l’-2’,  we  would  have  a  system 
in  three  variables  (pJpk  ,  rc,  t-J,  but  only  two  equations.  Each  equation  taken  separately  would 
yield  a  given  value  of  relative  prices  for  any  given  profit  rate.  But  since  these  equations  represent 
sectors  that  exchange  products  with  one  another  or  with  common  third  parties  (such  as  workers), 
the  same  relative  prices  must  hold  for  both.  Thus  only  certain  combinations  of  regulating  profit 
rates  are  sustainable  among  sectors,  precisely  because  the  sectors  are  linked.  This  has  several implications. 
First,  one  cannot  suppose  that  sectoral  regulating  profit  rates  can  be  independently  determined, 
say  by  something  like  the  sectoral  degree  of  concentration  or  some  other  index  of  ‘monopoly 
power’.  Suppose  that  an  increase  in  ‘concentration’  in  the  consumption  goods  sector  enabled 
regulating  firms  to  raise  their  relative  prices  by  20°h  over  the  competitive  level,  thereby  raising 
their  sectoral  rate  of  profit  by  some  amount  and  lowering  that  in  the  capital  goods  sector  by  some 
other  amount5.  Let  us  suppose  that  this  fall  in  profits  in  turn  provokes  a  shakeout  in  the  capital 
goods  sector,  i.e.  to  an  increase  in  its  own  concentration  ratio,  so  that  now  this  sector’s  relative 
prices  rise  by  20%.  Such  a  rise  would  then  restore  the  competitive  price  ratio  and  restore  the 
equality  of  profit  rate@.  A  general  rise  in  ‘concentration’and  'monopoly  power’  would  therefore 
produce  exactly  the  same  sectoral  distribution  ofprofit  rates  as  would  ongoing  competition. 
For  exactly  the  same  reasons,  we  cannot  speak  of  independently  determined  national  profit  rates 
when  there  is  international  exchange  among  sectoral  products.  National  profit  rates  are  linked 
once  commodity  trade  exists,  even  in  the  absence  of  international  capital  flows. 
We  can  turn  the  problem  around  by  noting  that  if  the  sectoral  relative  price  were  given  by  some 
set  of  forces,  this  would  immediately  determine  the  two  sectoral  profit  rates.  While  there  appears 
to  be  little  basis  for  arguing  in  favor  of  an  independent  determination  of  national  relative  prices, 
we  will  see  that  this  is  precisely  the  independent  determination  of  international  relative  prices 
which  is  essential  to  the  theory  of  comparative  advantage. 
4.  Regional  variations  arising  from  competition  within  one  nation 
I  have  emphasized  throughout  that  the  regulating  capitals  are  not  the  sole,  but  only  the  dominant, 
producers  of  a  product.  Suppose  therefore  that  there  existed  two  distinct  regions  in  the  nation, 
one  of  which  was  blessed  with  many  regulating  capitals  and  the  other  with  only  a  few.  It  would 
be  then  perfectly  understandable  if  consumers  in  the  competitively  weaker  region  tended  to  buy 
many  goods  which  were  produced  elsewhere.  At  the  same  time,  producers  in  this  same  region 
would  tend  to  have  difficulty  selling  many  of  their  products  outside  their  region.  And  so  it  would 
not  be  surprising  if  the  weak  region’s  ‘imports’  from  other  regions  within  the  same  nation  tended 
to  exceed  its  ‘exports’  from  them.  Such  a  region,  in  other  words,  would  tend  to  run  an  internal 
balance  of  trade  deficit,  which  could  only  be  sustained  if  there  were  other  flows  (such  as 
j  We  can  see  this  by  noting  that  Equations  l’-2’  with  separate  rates  of  profit  imply  that 
each  sector’s  profit  rate  rises  with  its  own  relative  price. 
Q  is  not  even  true  that  successive  rises  in  ‘monopoly  power’  would  necessarily  raise  the 
general  price  level,  since  a  rise  in  the  price  of  one  sector  may  be  attended  by  a  fall  in  the 
prices  of  some  others.  One  cannot  analyze  these  issues  without  addressing  the  the  theory  of 
the  general  price  level,  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
7 remittances,  outside  investments,  loans,  etc.)  to  cover  it.  This  is  a  completely  normal  outcome 
arising  from  competition  in  the  context  of  uneven  regional  development  within  a  nation,  and 
there  is  no  automatic  financial  mechanism  which  will  somehow  balance  things  out  (McCombie 
&  Thirwall,  1994,  pp.  xxiv-xxvi). 
It  is  also  obvious  that  any  two  regions  need  not  have  similar  average  price  indexes  even  though 
they  might  face  similar  individual  prices  for  all  tradable  goods,  because  they  need  not  produce 
(or  consume)  similar  baskets  of  goods  over  time.  And  of  course,  when  one  takes  into  account  the 
local  nontradable  goods  and  services,  then  the  price  index  differences  can  widen  even  further. 
Only  if  the  production  (or  consumption)  baskets  were  the  same,  and  if  tradableinontradable  price 
ratios  were  also  the  same,  and  both  remained  so  over  time,  would  the  regional  price  indexes  tend 
to  move  in  essentially  the  same  way  over  time. 
The  preceding  two  points  are  really  aimed  at  the  theory  of  long  run  international  terms  of  trade 
(real  exchange  rates).  Comparative  Advantage  theory  claims  that  if  the  two  regions  under 
discussion  happened  to  be  separate  nutions  instead,  then  the  real  exchange  rate  between  them 
would  automatically  move  to  balance  their  trade  --  i.e.  to  make  them  in  effect  equally 
competitive.  And  Purchasing  Power  Parity  (PPP)  claims  that  nations  will  tend  to  have  the  same 
average  price  levels,  or  at  least  the  same  price  index  changes,  so  that  over  time  the  real  exchange 
rate  will  be  roughly  constant,  i.e.  stationary  (Schumpeter,  1954,  p.  1106)(Harrod,  1933), 
(Dornbusch,  1988).  We  turn  to  such  issues  next. 
II.  The  determination  of  common-currency  international  prices 
1.  The  consequences  of  trade  among  nations 
We  now  consider  two  nations  (A,B)  with  currencies  (&$)  and  an  exchange  rate  e  ($/E).  Each 
nation  has  its  own  regulating  producers  in  each  industry,  its  own  rate  of  profit  on  regulating 
capitals,  and  its  own  corresponding  prices.  These  prices  now  represent  potential  international 
prices,  and  to  make  them  comparable,  it  is  necessary  to  express  them  all  in  a  common  currency 
(V. 
Table  1 
Country  A  (national  currency  =  ~5)  I  Country  B  (national  currency  =  $) 
At  the  opening  of  trade,  there  will  initially  be  two  prices  for  each  commodity,  since  each  country 
8 produces  each  good.  For  a  given  good,  the  lower  cost  producer  will  become  the  regulating  one, 
and  will  therefore  be  able  to  seize  some  part  of  the  other’s  market  through  its  own  exports. 
Let  us  assume  that  country  A  ends  up  exporting  consumption  goods,  and  country  B  capital 
goods’.  Then  country  A  determines  the  international  currency  price  of  consumption  goods  in 
both  countries,  country  B  that  of  capital  goods,  and  the  price  system  reduces  to  those  equations 
which  arise  from  the  regulating  conditions  of  production  --  that  is,  from  equations  5  and  6’, 
respectively,  subject  to  the  requirement  (the  law  of  one  price)  that  pkA’e =  p,&  and  pCB  pCA*e. 
7,  PcAee  =  @kAeacA  i-  ~cA’e-wrcA’lcA)‘~  I%) 
8)  PkB  =  bkBvakB  +  P~~‘e.wrk*‘lkB).(l’rB) 
Rewriting,  we  get 
7’)  pcAee  @kB  =  &A  i-  b&A-e  hkB  )’  wrcA  ’  &A  )‘(l+rA) 
8’)  1  =  (  akB  +  bcAee  hkB  )’  wrkB  ’  lkB  )‘(h) 
The  preceding  price  system  is  structurally  identical  to  that  in  the  national  case  with  profit 
differentials  across  sectors.  It  is  a  two  equation  system  in  three  variables:  the  international  terms 
oftrade  (real  exchange  rate)  z  =  pCA  *e /pi&, and  two  natiOna  profit  rates  rA, rB. As  before,  the  two 
different  profit  rates  cannot  independently  determined  (say  by  some  degrees  of  national 
‘monopoly’  power)8.  Fixing  one  will  determine  both  the  terms  of  trade  and  the  remaining  profit 
rate. 
But  now  the  alternate  possibility  takes  on  great  significance:  might  not  the  international  relative 
price  p&‘e  /pkB be  determined  through  some  other  set  of  relations,  which  would  in  turn  determine 
the  two  national  rates  of  profit?  This  is  precisely  the  closure  proposed  by  the  theory  qf 
comparative  advarztage,  because  it  argues  that  the  terms  of  trade  will  move  in  such  a  way  as  to 
be  ultimately  determined  by  the  requirement  that  trade  be  balanced. 
There  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  when  trade  opens,  it  will  be  already  be  balanced.  Assume 
therefore  that  country  A  has  an  initial  trade  deficit,  so  that  it  is  paying  out  money  to  finance  its 
excess  imports.  In  the  case  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  comparative  advantage  theory  assumes  that 
the  decrease  in  the  domestic  money  supply  resulting  from  such  an  outflow  would  lower  the 
‘The  story  would  be  the  same  if  initially  one  country  were  to  dominate  trade  in  both  goods 
-  as  in  Ricardo’s  own  famous  exposition.  In  this  case,  one  country  would  determine  the 
prices  of  both  goods,  hence  also  the  terms  of  trade. 
*If  however,  trade  barriers  permitted  all  the  prices  in  a  given  country  to  be  higher  than  those 
which  international  competition  might  impose,  the  profit  rates  would  be  partially  dependent 
on  local  conditions.  When  barriers  are  sufficient  to  altogether  choke  trade  off,  we  revert  to 
two  separate  national  systems  with  their  locally  determined  profit  rates. 
9 relative  domestic  price  level,  via  the  quantity  theory  of  money.  Since  the  nominal  exchange  rate 
is  fixed,  this  is  equivalent  to  lowering  the  terms  of  trade  z  (=  pCB.e  /pkA ).  In  the  case  of  flexible 
exchange  rates,  it  assumes  that  a  balance  of  trade  deficit  depreciates  the  nominal  exchange  rate 
leaving  relative  national  prices  remain  unchanged,  so  once  again  the  terms  of  trade  fall.  In  either 
case,  it  is  further  assumed  that  the  resulting  decline  in  the  terms  of  trade  improves  the  country’s 
trade  balance.  The  terms  of  trade  then  come  to  rest  when  exports  equal  imports,  and  are  therefore 
ultimately  determined  by  this  requirement.  As  is  well  known,  they  are  then  no  longer  regulated 
by  the  cost  of  the  producers  of  the  goods  involved. 
There  are  several  well-known  objections  to  the  comparative  advantage  argument  (McCombie  & 
Thirwall,  1994,  p.  124).  Partial  adjustment  may  take  place  through  output  and  employment 
declines  (relative  to  trend),  because  a  trade  deficit  will  to  reduce  aggregate  demand,  output  and 
hence  imports,  thereby  ameliorating  the  initial  trade  deficit.  At  the  same  time,  the  outflow  of 
money  due  to  an  ongoing  balance  of  trade  deficit  is  likely  to  reduce  liquidity  at  home  and  raise 
interest  rates,  thus  attracting  capital  flows  which  would  then  counterbalance,  rather  than  rectify, 
the  trade  imbalance.  Even  if  the  terms  of  trade  did  fall  somewhat,  there  is  the  ever  present 
question  of  whether  export  and  import  demand  would  be  sufficiently  elastic  to  lead  to  an 
improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  And  finally,  there  is  the  inescapable  empirical  fact  that 
international  trade  has  generally  not  been  balanced,  neither  under  tixed  nor  flexible  exchange  rate 
regimes  (Amdt  &  Richardson,  1987). 
Our  present  framework  provides  us  with  additional  grounds  for  skepticism,  because  the  terms  of 
trade  affect  not  only  the  trade  balance  but  also  the  dispersion  of  national  profit  rates.  The  balance 
of  trade  effect  is  familiar,  since  for  country  A 
9)  b  =  trade  ratio  =  pxA  *X* 1 [(pJe)*M,J  =  T.X(T,  YrJM(r,  Y*)  =  f(T,Y*,  YB) 
10)  B  =  b  -  1  =  f(T,YA,  YB)  =  trade  balance  relative  to  imports,  country  A 
where  px  ,  pm are  the  local  currency  export  and  foreign  currency  import  prices,  e  is  the  nominal 
exchange  rate  (foreign/local  currency),  z  is  the  previously  defined  terms  of  trade,  X(T,  Y&  M(T, 
YJ  are  export  and  import  functions,  and  Y  is  output.  Then  the  trade  balance  depends  on  the 
terms  of  trade,  though  a  decline  in  the  latter  will  improve  the  former  only  if  all  the  relevant 
elasticity  conditions  are  satisfied.  Even  in  this  case,  the  trade  balance  will  also  vary  positively 
with  foreign  output  and  negatively  with  domestic  output. 
The  profit-rate  effect  follows  from  the  fact  that  in  equations  7’-8’, any  fall  in  country  A’s  terms  of 
trade  z  would  lower  r*  and  raises  rB ‘.  Since  negative  profit  rates  are  unsustainable,  all  feasible 
variations  in  the  real  exchange  rate  must  be  confined  between  the  points  defined  by  rA, rB >  0,  or 
perhaps  by  the  even  narrower  range  rA -  i,t,  rB -  iB >  0  where  i  is  the  interest  rate. 
‘Equations  7’-8’ yields  1+  r*  =  r/(a  +  er*wrC@lC  ),  I+  rB =  l/(ak  +  Towrkolk  ). 
10 Figure  1  illustrates  both  sets  of  relations.  Assuming  log  linear  functional  forms  for  import  and 
export  function,  and  even  assuming  that  elasticity  conditions  are  fulfilled,  as  the  terms  of  trade 
vary  curves  B  1 -B3  trace  out  the  response  of  the  relative  trade  balance  for  three  alternate  levels  of 
national  output  YA  ,  while  curves  rA  and  rB  trace  out  the  response  of  national  profit  rates.  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  even  under  these  best  of  all  circumstances  it  is  entirely  possible  that  many  curves 
(e.g.  B  1,  B3)  may  fall  outside  the  feasible  range  of  profit  rateslO. 
Figure  I  :Terms  of  trade,  the  trade  balance,  and  national  profit  rates 
Terms  of  trade 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  evaluate  the  adjustment  process  implicit  in  the  comparative  cost 
story.  For  any  given  B-curve,  the  point  at  which  it  crosses  the  x-axis  represents  a  situation  of 
balanced  trade.  It  is  immediately  apparent  that  only  certain  curves  will  even  yield  a  trade  balance 
which  is  consistent  with  positive  profit  rates.  In  our  present  example,  only  curve  B2  satisfies  this 
requirement,  at  point  AO.  Conversely,  the  point  at  which  profit  rates  are  equalized  will  generally 
correspond  to  a  trade  imbalance  (extending  the  vertical  line  through  point  Al  indicates  a  surplus 
for  country  A  if  it  is  on  curves  B  1  and  B2,  and  a  deficit  on  curve  B3). 
Figure  1  makes  it  clear  that,  at  best,  the  terms  of  trade  can  only  vary  within  the  strict  limits 
imposed  by  the  positivity  of  sectoral  profit  rates  (which  may  be  net  of  interest).  Thus  even  if  the 
lo Following  (McCombie  &  Thirwall,  1994,  pp.  234-35),  Figure  1  assumes  M  =  a+  $YA)Z 
X  =  b?‘*  .(YB)‘*  ,  with  the  parameters  b/a=  0.68,  q  +  q*  -1  =  1.5,  rr  =  1.3,  n*  =  1.95, 
YA =  15,  and  Yr,  =  10,  13,  16,  successively,  to  generate  curves  Bl-B3. 
11 terms  of  trade  were  to  fall  in  response  to  a  trade  deficit,  and  even  if  all  elasticity  conditions  were 
assumed  to  hold”,  the  end  result  might  be  the  collapse  of  trade  rather  than  its  automatic  balance 
(i.e.  curve  Bl  is  only  compatible  with  a  trade  deficit  for  country  A,  and  B3  with  a  trade 
surplu~)~‘.  Secondly,  even  where  a  balanced  trade  situation  happens  to  be  feasible  on  profitability 
grounds,  as  in  point  AO, this  will  generally  correspond  to  unequal  profit  rates  among  nations.  And 
so  we  come  back  to  our  originazpoint  of  departure.  Unequal  profit  rates  will  provoke 
international  capital  flows,  move  the  terms  of  trade  toward  point  A,,  and  thereby  create  a  trade 
imbalance  sustained  by  these  very  same  capital  flows.  From  this  point  of  view,  general  trade 
imbalances  are  perfectly  normal  consequences  of  free  trade  in  the  face  of  international  capital 
mobility. 
2.  International  competitive  prices 
Let  us  suppose  that  international  profit  rate  differentials  do  indeed  provoke  capital  flows 
sufficient  to  (roughly)  equalize  profit  rates  on  new  investments.  Then  we  may  write  the 
international  price  equations  7’-8’ as 
The  preceding  equation  system  is  identical  to  our  previous  one  for  national  competitive  prices 
(equations  l’-2’).  Only  now,  in  addition  to  the  international  profit  rate,  the  international  terms  of 
tradepCA.e  /pkB are  also  determined,  for  any  given  national  real  wages.  This  is  a  direct  extension 
of  the  results  of  national  competition  to  the  case  of  international  competition,  and  it  yields 
similar  results  for  the  equilibrium  international  rate  of  profit  and  terms  of  trade  (real  exchange 
rate).  It  should  be  emphasized  that  since  only  regulating  rates  of  profit  are  equalized  across 
sectors,  average  profit  rates  across  nations  (which  encompass  nonregulating  capitals  and 
nontradable  goods)  need  not  be  equal. 
I’  Equation  11  in  the  next  section  sheds  more  light  on  the  potential  flexibility  of  the  terms 
of  trade 
“Ricardo’s  original  example  is  instructive  in  this  regard.  When  trade  is  opened,  the  initial 
absolute  cost  advantage  of  Portuguese  producers  allows  them  invade  both  English  wine  and 
cloth  markets.  Ofcourse,  the  fall  in  commodity  prices  there  must  lower  the  profits  ofEnglish 
producers,  which  could  well  drive  one  or  both  sectors  out  of  production.  Ricardo  does  not 
dwell  on  this  aspect.  Instead,  he  assumes  that  the  English  continue  to  purchase  Portuguese 
goods.  The  resulting  flow  of  funds  from  England  to  Portugal  is  assumed  to  lower  costs  in  the 
former  and  raise  them  in  the  latter,  until  the  Portuguese  cloth  industry  succumbs  and  the 
English  one  is  revived  or  or  even  resurrected. 
12 r  =  r(wrcA  ,  wrkB  1 
z  =  PcB  l  2  hk.4  =  Wh  ,  wrkB  ,  ’  1  =  f(wrcA  ,  wrkB  1 
Exactly  as  in  the  national  case,  we  can  provide  a  powerful  approximation  to  the  international 
relative  price  via  relative  real  vertically  integrated  unit  labor  costs  (Shaikh,  1998a).This  implies 
that  unless  yea1  wages  themselves  are  altered  in  theprocess  of  a&stment,  the  terms  of  trade  will 
not  be  very  flexible  at  all. 
3.  Implications  of  a  determinate  terms-of-trade  for  the  balance  of  trade 
Equations  1 1 - 13  makes  it  clear  that  the  terms  of  trade  are  determined  by  the  international 
equalization  of  profit  rates,  and  that  they  will  generally  follow  the  evolution  of  real  unit  labor 
costs  over  time.  But  precisely  because  of  this,  they  cannot  also  serve  to  balance  trade  among 
nations  --  at  least,  not  unless  the  real  unit  labor  costs  (i.e.  real  wages  and  productivities)  which 
underly  them  were  to  themselves  make  the  required  adjustments.  But  no  such  automatic 
mechanism  exists. 
The  upshot  of  the  preceding  discussion  is  that  a  structurally  determined  terms  of  trade  will  tend 
to  result  in  structuraZ  trade  imbazances,  even  though  demand  and  real  exchange  rate  movements 
may  produce  substantial  variations  in  the  short  run.  This  is  a  critical  difference  between  absolute 
and  comparative  advantage  theories. 
4.  An  alternate  route  to  Thirwall’s  Law 
Equation  10  demonstrated  that  the  relative  trade  balance  depends  not  only  on  the  terms  of  trade, 
but  also  on  both  national  outputs:  B  =  f(T,Y*,  Ya).  Keynesian  theory  has  long  noted  that  there 
will  be  a  feedback  effect  between  the  two  nation’s  outputs  and  their  trade  balance.  But  this 
mutual  interdependence  does  not  imply  that  national  outputs  will  automatically  adjust  so  as  to 
make  B  =  0.  Indeed,  we  can  turn  the  problem  around.  If  the  time  paths  of  YA,  YB  are  nationally 
determined  (albeit  linked  by  their  mutual  trade  balance),  then  given  the  terms  of  trade  determinei 
by  international  profit-rate  equalization,  the  time  path  of  B  is  determined. 
B  will,  and  does,  generally  vary  over  time.  But  $it  happens  to  be  roughly  stable,  then  there  will 
necessarily  exist  a  particular  association  between  a  country’s  output  growth  and  its  export  growth 
called  Thirwall’s  Law  (Davidson,  1994,  pp.  220-22  1).  But  the  causation  is  different  here.  To  see 
this,  we  return  to  the  formula  for  the  relative  balance  of  trade  B  in  equations  9-10,  which  we  now 
write  as 
14)  B  =  b  -1  =  PX~  /M(T,  Y*)  -  1 
Since  the  terms  of  trade  are  determined  by  real  costs,  they  are  likely  to  change  relatively  slowly 
13 over  time.  If  in  addition  the  path  of  national  output  happens  to  result  in  a  stable  relative  trade 
balance,  country  A’s  exports  and  imports  must  be  growing  at  roughly  the  same  rates,  which 
necessarily  implies  that  growth  of  exports  and  of  domestic  output  are  linked  via  country  A’s 
income  elasticity  of  imports: 
15)  E?Y  =  gx  hl.Y 
where  gy,  gx  =  rates  of  growth  of  Y*  ,  X*  ,  respectively,  and  ~~~~ =  the  income  elasticity  of 
imports  for  country  A  .  I3  This  is  the  same  association  posited  in  Thirwall’s  Law.  McCombie  and 
Thirwall  derive  it  from  the  theoretical  assumption  trade  is  balanced  in  the  long  run  (B  =  0,  b  =  l), 
coupled  with  the  empirical  observation  that  terms  of  trade  change  slowly  over  time  (r  =  constant) 
(McCombie  &  Thirwall,  1994,  p.  236,  equation  3.8,  and  pp.  301-304).  In  our  case,  however,  it 
results  from  a  contingent  empirical  stability  of  any  particular  trade  imbalance  (B  =  constant) 
coupled  with  the  theoretically  derived  stability  of  the  terms  of  trade  (T  =  JVY~~*  &  /w~~**&*  ). 
A  further  implication  of  the  structural  determination  of  terms  of  trade  is  that  the  devaluation  of  a 
currency  will  not  have  a  lasting  effect  unless  it  indirectly  affects  real  unit  labor  costs.  Insofar  as 
prices  take  time  to  adapt  to  a  devaluation,  the  initial  effect  might  well  be  to  lower  a  country’s 
international  terms  of  trade  (its  real  exchange  rate)  and  hence  improve  its  balance  of  trade.  But 
unless  the  resulting  rise  in  import  prices  were  to  always  reduce  the  real  wage  to  the  point  of  trade 
balance  (which  would  at  the  very  least  require  that  workers  were  totally  unable  to  defend  any 
particular  standard  of  living)  the  long  run  terms  of  trade  would  be  still  be  ‘wrong’  and  a  structural 
trade  balance  would  reappear. 
Finally,  the  assumption  that  the  Law  of  One  Price  holds  for  each  traded  good  does  not 
necessarily  imply  that  national  price  indexes  will  be  similar,  because  tradable  baskets  may  differ 
across  nations  (see  section  5  below).  Thus  absolute  Purchasing  Power  Parity  (PPP)  will  not 
generally  hold.  But  now  the  existence  of  exchange  rates  allows  for  a  particular  exception:  a 
country  experiencing  a  relatively  rapid  rate  of  inflation  would  experience  a  currency  depreciation 
of  comparable  magnitude,  so  that  relative  PPP  will  appear  to  hold  in  this  particular  case.  From 
equation  7  we  see  that  the  product  of  national  relative  prices  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  must 
track  the  evolution  of  relative  real  vertically  integrated  unit  labor  costs.  But  because  the  latter 
will  move  fairly  slowly,  the  bulk  of  any  substantial  inflationary  rise  in  relative  prices  must  be 
I3 With  the  relative  trade  balance  B  =  vX~  /M(r,  Y*)  -  1  =  constant,  and  with  the  terms  of 
trade  z  changing  slowly,  exports  and  imports  growth  rates  must  be  roughly  equal:  gx  =  gM 
The  latter  term  can  be  further  broken  down  by  noting  that  total  derivative  of  the  import 
function  dM  =  (aM/&)*dr  +  (dM/aY,JdY,\  .  Then  with  z  changing  slowly,  gM  = 
(dM/dt)(l/M)  =  (cwy)*gy,  where  E~,~ =  (~M/I~YJ(Y~/M)  =  income  elasticity  of  imports, 
and  gy  =  (dY*  /dt)*(l/Y*  ).  Substituting  the  expression  for  g,,,, back  into  the  expression  gx 
=  gM gives  us  equation  15,  Thirwall’s  Law. 
14 attended  by  a  corresponding  depreciation  in  the  nominal  currency14.  Therefore  relative 
purchasing  power  parity  wiZ1 appear  to  hold  when  relative  inflation  rates  are  high,  but  will  tend 
not  to  hold  otherwise.  This  is  precisely  what  we  find  empirically  . 
5.  Nontradable  goods 
Like  regions,  countries  will  generally  have  some  goods  which  are  nontradables,  because  they  are 
too  expensive  to  transport  across  nations.  Since  price  arbitrage  is  not  feasible,  even  otherwise 
similar  nontradable  goods  produced  in  two  countries  must  be  treated  as  distinct  national  goods. 
Suppose  therefore  that  each  country  has  a  distinct  nontradable  good. 
If  the  nontradables  were  pure  ‘luxury’  (non-basic)  goods  which  did  not  enter  into  either 
production  or  the  real  wage  basket,  then  nothing  much  would  change  in  our  analysis.  We  could 
append  two  distinct  national  price  equations  to  our  system  in  equations  I  I - 12.  The  price  of 
nontradables  would  be  affected  by  the  prices  of  traded  consumption  and  capital  goods,  but  not 
vice  versa.  The  terms  of  trade  in  particular  would  not  be  altered.  Even  so,  the  real  exchange  rate 
in  terms  of  general  national  price  indexes  would  now  depend  on  both  the  terms  of  trade  and  the 
mixture  of  tradablejnontradable  goods. 
But  if  nontradables  enter  into  production  or  workers’  consumption,  then  the  analysis  gets  more 
complicated.  The  two  additional  commodities  in  the  system  can  now  affect  both  the  terms  of 
trade  (through  real  wages  and  materials  costs)  and  the  real  exchange  rate  (Shaikh  1999,  1998). 
The  long  run  terms  of  trade  are  still  determined  by  the  international  equalization  of  profit  rates, 
but  now  they  also  reflect  the  costs  of  nontradables. 
6.  The  conditions  for  international  profit  rate  equalization 
The  argument  put  forth  in  the  previous  section  has  depended  on  a  presumed  tendency  for  profit 
rates  to  equalize  across  international  investments.  It  is  therefore  useful  to  note  that  while 
competitive  flows  of  direct  investment  are  sufficient,  they  are  not  strictly  necessary.  Short  term 
international  capital  flows  can  equally  well  provide  a  sufficient  force. 
If  financial  capital  moves  across  nations,  it  will  tend  to  equalize  international  rates  of  return  on 
bonds.  But  since  these  are  competitively  linked  to  national  rates  of  return  on  (new)  real 
investment,  the  latter  will  also  tend  to  be  equalized  --  without  the  need  for  international  direct 
investment  flows!  This  means  that  the  international  mobility  of  financial  capital,  which  is  as  old 
14The depreciation  of  a  currency  subject  to  substantial  inflationary  pressure  comes  about  in 
part  because  more  stable  foreign  currencies  becomes  a  substitute  for  domestic  money  when 
inflation  rates  are  high  and  variable  (Agenor  &  Montiel,  1996,  pp.  89-95). 
15 as  capitalism  itselc  is  sufficient  to  produce  a  substantial  tendency  toward  the  equalization  of 
international  rates  of  return  on  new  investment.  Direct  investment  of  course  fi_u-thers this  process, 
but  it  need  not  be  its  sole,  or  even  principal,  instrument.  Large  flows  of  direct  investment  flows 
are  therefore  not  required. 
7.  The  balance  of  payments  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate 
Determinate  terms  of  trade  and  given  national  output  paths  are  consistent  with  persistent 
structural  trade  imbalances.  Suppose  a  country  has  a  trade  deficit.  It  may  also  have  particular  net 
long  term  capital  flows  (in  or  out)  arising  from  the  equalization  of  rates  of  return,  corresponding 
flows  of  wages,  profits  and  dividends,  and  various  other  exogenous  items.  If  these  flows  cover 
the  trade  deficit,  then  the  balance  of  payments  will  be  zero  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  will  be 
stable.  If  they  overfill  or  underfill  the  gap  in  the  balance  of  payments  left  by  the  trade  deficit, 
then  there  exists  endogenous  mechanisms  which  will  bring  the  balance  of  payments  back  into 
line. 
The  mechanism  in  question  arises  from  the  effect  of  balance  of  payments  surpluses  or  deficits  on 
domestic  liquidity.  For  instance,  an  ongoing  balance  of  payments  deficit  implies  a  net  outflow  of 
tinds  from  the  country,  which  will  lower  liquidity  and  hence  tend  to  raise  interest  rates  and  rates 
of  return  on  financial  assets  (Harrod,  1933,  p.  53)“.  The  raised  rates  of  return  will  in  turn  attract 
short  term  international  capital  inflows  to  fill  the  balance  of  payments  gap,  which  will  also  raise 
liquidity  and  drive  domestic  (risk-adjusted)  rates  of  return  back  down  towards  equality  with 
foreign  ones16. 
In  the  case  of  managed  exchange  rates,  the  government  will  have  to  counteract  the  potential 
fi.mds  outflow  so  as  to  maintain  the  nominal  exchange  rate.  Thus  the  balance  of  trade  deficit  is 
covered  through  an  outflow  of  government  reserves  and  interest  rates  need  not  change  on  this 
account.  In  the  absence  of  such  intervention  (flexible  exchange  rates),  the  drain  on  liquidity  will 
raise  interest  rates  and  attract  short  term  capital  into  the  country  -  until  at  some  point  the  balance 
of  trade  deficit  is  fully  covered  ”  In  effect,  the  short  term  capital  inflows  or  outflows  serve  to  ‘top  . 
15This is  also  Ricardo’s  point  of  departure,  but  he  argues  that  the  outflow  of  money  induced 
by  persistent  trade  deficit  lowers  the  national  price  level,  via  the  Hume  Specie  Flow 
mechanism. 
“jIn  a  growing  economy,  which  is  the  rule,  the  equalization  of  rates  of  return  across  sectors 
is  compatible  with  persistent  net  investment  in  each  sector.  Sectoral  investment  flows  then 
accekrate  when  returns  are  above  normal.  In  the  same  manner,  persistent  net  capital  flows 
across  nations  are  compatible  with  equalized  international  rates  of  return. 
“In  all  of  this,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  may  initially  fall  due  to  the  initial  balance  of 
payments  deficit,  and  then  rise  back  as  the  latter  is  filled  in.  To  the  extent  that  terms  of  trade 
16 off’  any  balance  of  payments  deficit  or  surplus  resulting  fi-om  the  sum  of  the  trade  balance  and 
exogenous  capital  flows. 
These  particular  ‘topping  off’  flows  are  driven  by  arbitrage  between  international  rates  of  return 
on  assets.  A  similar  mechanism  is  implicit  in  The  Monetary  Approach  to  the  Balance  of 
Payments  (MAB),  since  it  assumes  equalized  international  interest  rates.  Portfolio  Balance  (PB) 
models,  one  the  other  hand,  tend  to  treat  domestic  financial  assets  as  different  from  foreign  ones, 
by  positing  different  national  agents  with  distinct  asset  demand  functions.  The  two  approaches 
are  if  the  PB  approach  is  viewed  as  an  analysis  of  the  risk-premium  between  the  assets  (Isard, 
1995,  p.  111).  But  if  that  is  not  the  case,  then  we  would  need  supplement  the  PB  formulation  with 
an  additional  set  of  agents,  arbitrageurs,  whose  sole  concern  would  be  to  move  their  capital  in 
response  to  differentials  in  risk-adjusted  rates  of  return,  thereby  providing  the  necessary 
balancing  flows.  In  this  way  we  are  led  back  to  the  classical  (and  MAB)  result  on  the 
international  equalization  of  financial  rates  of  return  -  regardless  of  the  intents  or  psychologies 
of  agents  who  are  not  arbitrageurs. 
III.  Summary  and  some  implications 
Comparative  advantage  theory  is  generally  presented  in  two  forms.  As  a  normative  proposition 
about  what  should  happen  in  free  trade.  And  as  a  positive  statement  about  the  actual  tendencies 
of  free  trade  among  capitalist  nations.  The  latter  claims  that  free  trade  will  automatically  make 
all  nations  equally  competitive  in  the  world  arena,  no  matter  how  different  their  existing  levels  of 
development.  The  theory  admits  that  such  differences  may  initially  produce  trade  patterns  in 
which  the  strong  dominate  the  weak.  But  it  argues  that  if  market  forces  are  given  free  rein,  they 
will  drive  the  real  exchange  rate  to  that  level  which  will  make  trade  balance  among  all  countries. 
Given  sufficient  time”  (and  sufficient  faith),  free  trade  will  supposedly  level  the  international 
playing  field. 
No  such  tendencies  are  discemable  at  an  empirical  level.  Trade  imbalances  have  been  endemic 
during  fixed,  flexible,  and  mixed  exchange  rate  regimes.  This  paper  argues  that  the  historical 
record  is  perfectly  coherent,  because  the  long  run  real  exchange  rate  is  actually  regulated  by 
relative  real  costs  of  production,  through  the  international  mobility  of  capital.  Rather  than 
moving  to  automatically  eliminate  existing  inequalities  in  international  competitiveness,  free 
trade  actually  reflects  these  existing  inequalities. 
From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  absolute  advantage  which  regulates  international  competition,  just 
remain  tied  to  costs,  relative  prices  will  then  fluctuate  in  the  opposite  manner. 
“(Froot,  1995,  pp.  16.57,  1662)  suggest  that  it  might  take  75  or  even  a  100  years  for  the  real 
exchange  rate  to  converge  to  PPP. 
17 as  it  does  competition  within  a  nation.  Absolute  advantage  theory  implies  that  trade  imbalances 
will  tend  to  persist,  because  they  reflect  structural  inequalities  in  the  real  production  costs  of 
nations.  It  implies  that  devaluations  will  not  have  a  lasting  effect  on  trade  balances,  unless  they 
are  also  attended  by  fundamental  changes  in  these  very  same  costs  (i.e.  in  national  real  wages 
and  productivities).  If  not,  trade  imbalances  will  provoke  counterbalancing  international  capital 
flows,  with  a  concomitant  build-up  of  international  debt  burdens.  Finally,  it  implies  that  neither 
the  absolute  nor  relative  versions  of  the  Purchasing  Power  Parity  hypothesis  (PPP)  will  generally 
hold,  because  the  path  of  real  exchange  rates  will  reflect  the  slow  but  persistent  evolution  of 
these  relative  real  costs.  The  one  exception  is  that  the  relative  version  of  PPP  will  appear  to  hold 
if  a  country  experiences  a  relatively  high  inflation  rate  --  for  then  its  nominal  exchange  rate  will 
depreciate  by  close  to  the  same  rate,  in  order  to  keep  the  real  exchange  rate  on  track  with  relative 
real  costs.  All  of  these  propositions,  and  others,  are  documented  in  (Shaikh,  1998b),  along  with 
empirical  tests  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  terms  of  trade  are  determined  by  real  unit  labor  costs. 
18 Appendix:  effects  ofreal  wage  increases  on  the  general  rate  ofprojit 
The  effects  in  question  do  not  depend  on  a  2x2  model,  Denoting  n-dimensional  vectors  and 
square  matrices  in  bold,  and  letting  B  stand  for  the  matrix  of  the  standard-of-living  bundles  of  the 
workers  in  each  sector  and  L  stand  for  a  diagonal  matrix  of  labor  coefficients,  we  can  write 
1)  p  =  p*(A  +  B*L)*(l  +  r) 
2)  pm[(l/(l  +  r)  -  (A  +  B*L)  ]  =  0 
As  is  well  known,  the  term  l/(  1  +  r)  is  the  dominant  characteristic  root  of  the  matrix  (A  +  B*L), 
while  the  vector  of  relative  prices  p  (determined  up  to  a  constant)  is  the  dominant  characteristic 
vector.  Of  interest  is  the  result  that  a  rise  in  any  of  the  coefficients  of  the  the  matrix  (A  +  B.L) 
will  raise  the  dominant  root  and  hence  lower  the  general  rate  of  profit.  Subsumed  under  this  are 
increases  in  any  element  of  the  workers’  standard-of-living  matrix  B. 
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